Law, Plans and Practical Rartionality by Celano, B.
 2012, Diritto e questioni pubbliche, Palermo. 
 











There is, according to many contemporary jurisprudential theories, a tight relationship 
between law and practical rationality: the law gives us, or at least it purports to give us, 
reasons for action. In his book, Legality (2011), Scott J. Shapiro puts forward what at 
first glance appears to be a new view in this vein. Shapiro calls it the “Planning Theory” 
of law; it provides an account of what the law is in terms of a particular kind of reasons: 
plans (a notion moulded, in his work in the philosophy of action, by Michael E. 
Bratman). In this paper, I provide a reconstruction of the Planning Theory as a view of 
the relationships between law and practical rationality, and I point to some fundamental 
issues which, when considered in this light, the theory leaves open, or which seem to 
raise trouble for it. 
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1. The reasons paradigm – 2. The rationality of plans – 3. The 
possibility of law – 4. The authority of plans – 5. Fundamental is-




1.  The reasons paradigm 
 
There is, according to many contemporary jurisprudential 
theories, a tight relationship between law and practical ra-
tionality: the law gives us, or at least it purports to give us, 
reasons for action. The rationale for this claim is not hard to 
find. The concept of a reason is ‒ we may assume ‒ the ba-
sic normative concept («reasons provide the ultimate basis 
for the explanation of all practical concepts»)1. The law ‒ 
we may further assume ‒ makes, or at least it purports to 
make, a practical difference to our lives, in this way: it 
guides, or at least it purports to guide, our conduct, by tell-
ing us what we ought to do. This is ‒ so the assumption 
goes ‒ a basic fact about what the law is: a platitude any 
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D&Q, n. 12/2012 212 
plausible theory of the nature of law should be able to ac-
count for. From these two assumptions it follows that it 
must be possible to give an account of the law in terms of 
reasons and reasons-giving. We should be able to show, that 
is, how laws figure (or may, or should figure) in practical 
reasoning. Explaining this will amount to giving an account 
of what the law is ‒ of its very nature.  
We may call this general outlook “the reasons paradigm” 
in contemporary legal theory. Different versions of the rea-
sons paradigm disagree, however, on just how the relevant 
relationship should be understood: on what the form, or 
forms, of reasoning are, purporting to guide our actions, 
which the law supports. Or, to put it in a different way, there 
is widespread disagreement, between defenders of the rea-
sons paradigm, about what kind, or kinds, of reasons for 
action the law is supposed to (purport to) give us. 
So, for instance, it may be held that the law merely gives 
us fragments of prudential reasons for action, by specifying 
conditions our behaviour has to satisfy if we are to achieve 
our desired ends2. Or, to take another, influential, example 
 
 
2  This view is not characteristic of contemporary jurisprudence. It 
may be found, e.g., in Bentham’s and Austin’s theories of law. And, 
according to this view, law does not, as such, guide our behaviour ‒ or 
even purport to guide it. It merely indicates the ways in which we are 
to behave, if we are to follow the lead of those factors which may ac-
tually be said to move us to action, namely, our desires. Thus, it may 
be disputed whether this view may properly be reckoned a version of 
the reasons paradigm, as defined in the text. I have mentioned it here, 
however, because ‒ to the extent that fragments of complete pruden-
tial reasons may themselves properly be called “reasons” (e.g., that 
there are snakes around here is a good reason not to wear sandals, if 
you wish to stay alive) ‒ it provides a perspicuous (though perhaps 
simplistic) interpretation of the general idea that the law purports to 
give us reasons for action (cfr. ENOCH 2011, 35). 
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(which, as we shall see, will have a prominent place in our 
discussion), according to Joseph Raz ‒ the founder and 
champion of the reasons paradigm in contemporary juris-
prudence ‒ the law claims to provide “protected” reasons 
for action, i.e., first-order reasons for acting in specified 
ways, which are also second-order exclusionary reasons for 
not acting on (some of) the reasons against acting in the 
relevant ways3.  
In his book, Legality4, Scott J. Shapiro has recently put 
forward what at first glance at least appears to be a new view 
in this vein. Shapiro calls it the “Planning Theory” (hereinaf-
ter PT, for short) of law. PT provides an account of what the 
law is in terms of a particular kind of reasons: plans; and of 
law’s role in practical reasoning as involving a peculiar kind 
of practical reasoning: planning, and the application of plans. 
As engaging, i.e., the rationality of planning.  
Plans, as Shapiro understands them, are a kind of 
norms5. By “norm” Shapiro means «any standard […] that is 
supposed to guide conduct and serve as a basis for evalua-
tion or criticism»6. It is by no means unusual, of course, to 
characterize laws as norms. PT proposes a change of idiom: 
it provides an elaborate translation of usual talk of laws as 
norms ‒ of “legal norms” ‒ in the idiom of plans, and plan-
ning. The different kinds of norms that make up a legal sys-
tem are transposed into different kinds of plans (“require-
ments”, “authorizations”, “instructions”, and so on)7.  
Why is this translation ‒ this change of idiom ‒ supposed 
to be illuminating, or even informative at all? It all depends 
 
 
3  RAZ 1979, 18. 
4  SHAPIRO 2011a. 
5  SHAPIRO 2011a, 127. 
6  SHAPIRO 2011a, 41. 
7  SHAPIRO 2011a, 227 ff. 
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on what plans are taken to be, and on their specificity. What 
kind of reasons are plans? 
To be sure, the words “plan”, and “planning”, by them-
selves, do not say much. Shapiro is not asking us to check 
the “plan” entry in a good dictionary, and then re-write legal 
theory in terms of what we have found there. Rather, he 
wants to draw our attention to a particular theory of human 
action, built upon a particular notion of plan and planning; 
and he proposes a re-writing, adjustment, and further devel-
opment of our views about what the law is in terms of that 
theory. The relevant notion of a plan is the notion moulded, 
in his work in the philosophy of action, by Michael E. 
Bratman8. In labelling his own theory a “planning” theory of 
law Shapiro should be understood as referring to Bratman’s 
planning theory of agency. It is the resort to this concept of 
a plan, and to Bratman’s way of understanding human 
agency as planning agency, that, according to Shapiro, 
makes substantial progress in jurisprudence possible. Why? 
 
 
2.  The rationality of plans 
 
Let us start by rehearsing PT’s main tenets. The “central 
claim” of PT ‒ the “Planning Thesis” ‒ is that «legal activity 
is a form of social planning»9 (“legal activity” is defined as 
“the exercise of legal authority”10). 
 
«Legal institutions plan for the communities over which 
they claim authority, both by telling members what they 
may or may not do, and by identifying those who are enti-
 
 
8  BRATMAN 1987; BRATMAN 1999. 
9  SHAPIRO 2011a, 155. 
10  SHAPIRO 2011a, 195. 
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tled to affect what others may or may not do. Following this 
claim, legal rules are themselves generalized plans, or 
planlike norms, issued by those who are authorized to plan 
for others. And adjudication involves the application of 
these plans, or planlike norms, to those to whom they apply. 
In this way, the law organizes individual and collective be-
haviour so that members of the community can bring about 
moral goods that could not have been achieved, or achieved 
as well, otherwise»11. 
 
«[L]aws are plans»12. A legal system is «a massive network 
of plans, many of which regulate the same actions and many 
of which regulate the proper execution of each other»13. 
 
 
11  SHAPIRO 2011a, 155, see also 195. “Planlike” norms are norms 
which are not deliberately created with the purpose of guiding behaviour 
(which is a necessary feature of plans proper), but, nevertheless, operate 
as elements in complex plans (the paradigm case are customary norms 
within legal systems; SHAPIRO 2011a, 140 and 225). They will not be 
discussed here. Generally speaking, if plans are taken to belong to the 
domain of the intentional, it looks difficult for PT satisfactorily to ac-
commodate customary legal norms and, specifically, to account for the 
possibility of legal systems whose “fundamental rules” (Shapiro’s term; 
see below, n. 13) are customary (cfr. GARDNER and MACKLEM 2011; 
SCIARAFA 2011, 603 and 621, argues that PT «obscures the Hartian in-
sight that customary practice is an ineliminable and fundamental feature 
of legal systems»). I shall leave this issue aside. 
12  SHAPIRO 2011a, 195. 
13  SHAPIRO 2011a, 230. An alternative statement of PT’s main thesis 
(by no means equivalent to the one given in the text, as we shall see 
below, 5.1) is this: «the fundamental rules of legal systems are plans. 
Their function is to structure legal activity so that participants can 
work together and thereby achieve goods and realize values that 
would otherwise be unattainable» (emphasis omitted) (SHAPIRO 
2011a, 119). PT, Shapiro claims, affords the resolution of some theo-
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How does the law, qua plans, «organize […] individual and 
collective behaviour» so that members of the community 
can achieve goals they could not achieve otherwise? To an-
swer this question we have to understand what the role is 
that plans play in practical reasoning and intentional action. 
And to understand this we have to turn to Bratman’s views. 
Human cognitive capacities, Bratman observes, are lim-
ited14. We cannot always, at each moment in our lives, start 
from scratch in deliberating on what to do, by weighing all 
the pros and cons of all presently available options in the 
light of the whole set of our present desires (or, generally, 
 
 
retical puzzles that have long affected jurisprudential inquiries. Spe-
cifically, it affords a solution to the Possibility Puzzle (how is legal 
authority possible? See below, 3) and it allows us to rebut Hume’s 
challenge against positivistic theories of law (you cannot derive an 
“ought” from an “is”). It does so by vindicating the positivist concep-
tion of law (see below, 3) against the main objections so far raised 
against its most influential (i.e., Austin’s and Hart’s) versions. More-
over, according to Shapiro answers to the question about the nature of 
law (and, thus, PT) contribute to providing answers about what is the 
law on particular issues, by grounding claims about legal authority 
and by contributing to establishing what the proper interpretive 
method is in a given jurisdiction (SHAPIRO 2011a, 18-25) (Answers to 
the question about the nature of law make a difference to legal prac-
tice, by contributing to determining which legal facts obtain, and, 
thus, the truth or falsity of legal propositions.) I shall not discuss these 
further claims here. Mine will not be an exposition of the whole of 
Shapiro’s theory of law. In particular, his treatment of issues concern-
ing interpretation and meta-interpretation (SHAPIRO 2011a, chs. 9-13) 
will remain out of the picture. My topic is PT in so far as it can be 
regarded as a version of the reasons paradigm, and, specifically, what 
the implications of PT’s main claim ‒ the Planning Thesis ‒ are for 
our understanding of the role that laws play (or may play, or should 
play) in our practical reasoning. 
14  In this and the next six paragraphs I follow BRATMAN 1987, chs. 1-7. 
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pro-attitudes) and beliefs. Rather, in order to coordinate our 
activities, both intrapersonally across time (i.e., in order to 
arrange our activities from the past to the future in an ordi-
nate and meaningful sequence, so as effectively to pursue 
ends) and interpersonally (i.e., in order to coordinate our 
actions with those of others in the achievement of complex 
goals, on the basis of relatively firm expectations about 
what the others will do), we need devices that constrain, and 
focus, our deliberation, enabling our present practical rea-
soning to develop continuously through time, and to influ-
ence the future ‒ devices, that is, that make it possible for us 
not to be “time-slice” agents. Plans are such devices. By 
making plans, agents with limited rationality give shape to 
the practical problems they face, and become able to extend 
their agency across time, and to cooperate with others in 
doing things they could not do by themselves.  
How do plans achieve this feat? Having a plan to A 
means that the issue of whether to A or not is settled. Plans 
settle practical questions; they are not up for grabs for re-
consideration at every moment. Rather, they involve a char-
acteristic sort of commitment: having a plan to A involves 
being committed to A-ing. 
This commitment has two dimensions. Plans control our 
action, and they structure our practical reasoning. It is the 
latter dimension that concerns us here.  
Plans are, typically, partial. When we adopt a plan, we 
typically leave its details, the means and preliminary steps to 
be taken in order to carry out the plan, and its specification in 
concrete circumstances, open, for future determination. So, to 
take a trivial example, if I plan to go to the bookstore tomor-
row, I may (and often I will) leave it open, for now, how, and 
at what time, I will go there ‒ and this holds, on a wider scale, 
also of more complex, articulated, or long-term plans. Break-
ing the plan into different parts, or subplans, finding out ap-
propriate ways of executing it, or different parts of it, filling in 
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details, specifying the plan, or its parts, relative to circum-
stances, are usually left to future deliberation. 
Plans, then, once adopted, pose, to our deliberation, a 
host of problems: problems concerning the means or pre-
liminary steps to be taken for their execution; the different 
subplans into which they are to be articulated; their appro-
priate specification in concrete circumstances. In Bratman’s 
phrase, adopting a plan puts an agent under a demand for 
“means-end coherence”. The agent has to find out appropri-
ate ways of carrying it out. Plans are, further, subject to re-
quirements of consistency: an agent’s plans have to be con-
sistent with each other (i.e., it must be logically possible for 
them to be executed jointly), and they have to be consistent 
with the agent’s beliefs (i.e., it must be logically possible for 
them to be executed in a world where the agent’s beliefs are 
true). Or, in other words, planning agents are subject to dis-
tinctive norms of rationality, concerning (1) the selection of 
appropriate means, preliminary steps, subplans of a given 
plan, or its specification; and (2) the overall consistency of 
the agent’s plans and beliefs15. These norms define what 
may be called “the rationality of planning”; they give rise to 
demands ‒ normative requirements ‒ a rational planning 
agent is supposed to live up to16. 
 
 
15  A third category of norms of rationality in planning ‒ norms for the 
rational reconsideration of plans ‒ will be introduced below, 5.2. 
16  Bratman conceives of different kinds of mental states in terms of 
distinctive sets of dispositions to act and to think in certain ways (hav-
ing a mental state of type T typically involves being disposed to…) 
and associated norms of rationality (an agent having a mental state of 
type T should reasonably…). He terms this kind of outlook “function-
alist” (BRATMAN 1987, 9 f.). In theories of this kind, the two series of 
items (on the one hand, what agents, given mental state S, typically 
are disposed to do or think, and, on the other hand, what they, given 
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These demands constrain our practical reasoning, and give 
it a shape. The demand of means-end coherence provides a 
standard of relevance of options. The demand of consistency, 
in turn, provides a standard of admissibility of options. When 
I have a plan to A, I am committed to considering, in my de-
liberation, only relevant and admissible (relative to A-ing) 
options. This gives a focus to my practical reasoning, ena-
bling it to develop continuously, and extend its influence, 
across time. Thus, plans make intrapersonal coordination of 
the agent’s various activities from the past to the future, and 
the formation of relatively firm mutual expectations (and, 
thus, interpersonal coordination) possible. 
Thus, plans ‒ typically, partial plans ‒ play, in our prac-
tical reasoning, a characteristic role: they provide a frame-
work within which our deliberations take a definite shape, 
defining the problems we face and the range of relevant and 
admissible solutions. Bratman summarizes these findings by 
saying that plans provide, as inputs to our practical reason-
ing, a peculiar kind of reasons, different from ordinary de-
sire-belief reasons for action, which he terms “framework 
reasons”. Human agency is rationalized, inter alia, by such 
framework reasons. It is thanks to such reasons that we are 
not “time-slice agents”. 
PT’s fundamental tenets (above, in this section) have to 
be understood along these lines. In claiming that laws are 
plans, Shapiro is claiming that they play, in “our” (who are 
“we”, here? This is one of the important issues PT has to 
deal with; see below, 5.1) practical reasoning, this role. 
Laws, qua plans, involve a characteristic sort of commit-
ment: they guide both our actions and our reasoning, by pos-
 
 
S, should ‒ reasonably ‒ do or think) mirror each other. How, and 
why, this could be so is a fundamental problem in the philosophy of 
mind we may leave aside here. 
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ing us problems concerning the ways in which they are to be 
carried out or specified (laws, says Shapiro, typically are 
partial plans: those in charge of their implementation, or 
application, have to fill in details, and devise appropriate 
subplans), subject to demands of consistency. 
This is the core of PT, so far as law’s impact on practical 
reasoning is concerned. As we have seen, planning, as a 
distinctive kind of commitment peculiar to agents of 
bounded rationality, enabling intrapersonal and interper-
sonal coordination across time, is subject (Bratman argues) 
to distinctive norms of rationality (means-end coherence, 
consistency, and ‒ see below, 5.2 – norms of rational recon-
sideration); laws (PT claims) play the same roles, and are 
subject to these very same norms. 
This, to repeat, is the core of PT (as far as its import on 
the reasons paradigm in jurisprudence is concerned). In or-
der to get a fuller picture of the theory, however, we have to 
supplement some more elements. 
Laws are not individual plans. They are, Shapiro argues, 
shared plans. 
 
«Not only are some aspects of legal activity shared, but so is the 
whole process. Legal activity is a shared activity in that the 
various legal actors involved play certain roles in the same ac-
tivity of social planning: some participate by making and affect-
ing plans and some participate by applying them. Each has a 
part to play in planning for the community. Call this the “Shared 
Agency Thesis”»: «legal activity is shared activity»17. 
 
 
17  SHAPIRO 2011a, 204. In accounting for the possibility and structure of 
shared plans, Shapiro builds upon Bratman’s work (BRATMAN 1999, chs. 
5-8; BRATMAN 2009a) on “jointly intentional action”. In order to make 
room for the possibility ‒ crucial to the existence of legal practice ‒ of 
“alienated” participants, however, he further develops Bratman’s views, 
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In fact, Shapiro claims18, groups of individuals faced with seri-
ous practical (and, specifically, moral) problems, whose solu-
tions are complex, contentious, or (in the case of coordination 
problems proper, in the strict game-theoretical sense) arbitrary, 
will soon experience the limitations of spontaneous ordering, 
and will resort to social planning: likewise, they will soon ex-
perience the limitations of unstructured, unordered social plan-
ning (relying on negotiation, or the search for consensus), and 
develop sophisticated “technologies of planning”, enabling 
them to cope effectively with those problems. The basic ingre-
dients of such technologies of planning are hierarchy (certain 
members of the group plan for the whole group, certain mem-
bers of the group plan that certain members of the group will 
plan, re subject matter S, for the whole group, and so on), and 
its institutionalization (specifically, the creation of abstract, sta-
ble roles ‒ “offices” ‒ within the structure of planning activities, 
distinct from the concrete individuals temporarily occupying 
them; and the determination of the procedures to be followed in 
exercising these planning offices). The law is, Shapiro claims, a 
complex institutionalized structure of social planning of this 
kind19. Thanks to this structure, the community has available 
social plans which “do the thinking” for the group, settling for 
the whole community unique solutions to the practical problems 
it faces (coordination games, battles of the sexes, complex or 




and moulds a new notion, “massively shared agency” (SHAPIRO 2011a, 
143 ff.). I do not (apart from some hints, see below, 5.1) discuss this 
part of PT here. 
18  SHAPIRO 2011a, chs. 6 and 7. 
19  What the features are that distinguish the law from other structures 
of this kind (SHAPIRO 2011a, 210-226) need not detain us here (see for 
a discussion RIPSTEIN 2012). 
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«[L]egal activity […] seeks to accomplish the same basic 
goals that ordinary, garden‒variety planning does, namely, 
to guide, organize, and monitor the behaviour of individuals 
and groups. It does this by helping agents lower their delib-
eration, negotiation, and bargaining costs, increase predict-
ability of behaviour, compensate for ignorance and bad 
character, and provide methods of accountability»20. 
 
 
3.  The possibility of law 
 
According to Shapiro PT entails the solution of a fundamen-
tal puzzle, which has long vexed legal theory. The puzzle 
(“the Possibility Puzzle”) concerns the very possibility of 
the law, and is, roughly, this: on the one hand, it takes an 
official to create a legal norm; on the other hand, it takes a 
legal norm to make an official (an individual can create a 
legal norm only if empowered to do so; and only a legal 
norm can empower an individual). This gives rise to an infi-
nite regress (norm N1 is created by official O1, who is em-
powered to create norms by N2, which is created by O2, and 
so on), or to a vicious circle (N1 is created by O1, who is 
empowered to create norms by N1; or, O1 is empowered to 
create norms by N1, which is created by O1)21. PT, Shapiro 
claims, avoids both, and affords a way out. 
How? The solution depends on the source of the author-
ity of plans, and on the way in which they come into exis-
tence. Plans, observes Shapiro, are, undoubtedly, positive 
 
 
20  SHAPIRO 2011a, 200. 
21  Some commentators have argued that, contrary to what Shapiro 
claims, this is not a genuine paradox, and that the appearance of a 
paradox stems from equivocation (SCIARAFFA 2011; CHIASSONI 2012, 
par. 7.5; POGGI 2012). We may remain agnostic on this issue here. 
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norms 22 : they come into existence just in case they are 
formed and adopted by human beings. The power to form 
and adopt plans is not “conferred on us by morality”23. Hu-
man agents have it, in virtue of the norms of instrumental 
rationality: the power to form and adopt plans, as we have 
seen (see above, 2), consists of a set of dispositions, typical 
of human agents, and associated norms of rationality24.  
The norms of instrumental rationality, in turn, are not 
created by anyone. They exist in virtue of their content 
(«[t]hey exist simply in virtue of being rationally valid prin-
ciples»)25 . Plans exist, when dispositions of the relevant 
kind occur, in (rough) accordance with these norms. They 
come into existence just in case agents exercise, as a matter 
of fact, this capacity. Thus, the existence of plans depends, 
given human capacity for planning, on non-moral, socio-
logical and historical facts alone (it does not depend on 
moral norms). In the case of plans, says Shapiro, «positiv-
ism is trivially and uncontroversially true»26. 
This is the reason why PT ‒ the thesis that laws are plans 
 
 
22  SHAPIRO 2011a, 128. 
23  SHAPIRO 2011a, 119. 
24  But why “instrumental” rationality? Our capacity for planning, 
says Shapiro (SHAPIRO 2011a, 123) following Bratman (BRATMAN 
1987, 35), has a “pragmatic rationale”: there are good pragmatic, or 
instrumental, reasons (such as the pursuit of complex ends with lim-
ited resources, or «a lack of trust in our future selves», SHAPIRO 
2011a, 122) why humans engage in planning. In other words: plans 
are “universal means” (SHAPIRO 2011a, 173; BRATMAN 1999, 5): they 
enable agents effectively to pursue their various ends, whatever these 
may be. Thus, the rational demands they are subject to ‒ and which 
are constitutive of the very capacity of planning (see above, 2) ‒ are 
demands of instrumental rationality. 
25  SHAPIRO 2011a, 181. 
26  SHAPIRO 2011a, 119. 
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‒ solves, according to Shapiro, the Possibility Puzzle. And it 
affords, moreover, a positivistic solution to it. Human agents 
can form and adopt plans. This gives rise to a distinctive 
kind of commitment (see above, 2): plans have authority 
over planners. But this commitment (the authority of plans) 
presupposes no norm, apart from the norms of instrumental 
rationality. These are not positive norms (this avoids the 
regress, and the vicious circle)27. Nor are they moral norms 
(and this gives the lie to natural law theories). Thus, if laws 
are plans, the existence of the laws ultimately depends on 
social facts (and on facts about human agency as planning 
agency), not on moral ones. Positivism is vindicated28. 
The authority that plans ‒ including legal plans ‒ have 
on agents, then, depends on the bare fact of their being 
formed and adopted (and on norms of instrumental rational-
ity). According to PT, at the foundation of a legal system 
lies a distinctive human capacity ‒ the capacity human 
agents have to commit themselves through forming and 
adopting plans ‒ plus a set of historical or sociological facts 
(acts of exercise of this capacity)29. 
 
 
27  No empowered official ‒ thus, no norm empowering her ‒ is re-
quired to put them into being. 
28  «[T]he creation and persistence of the fundamental rules of law is 
grounded in the capacity that all individuals possess to adopt plans» 
(SHAPIRO 2011a, 119). SCHAUER 2010, 595, n. 33, observes that 
«[m]uch of Shapiro’s argument is situated within […] the attempt to 
explain how law can provide oughts ‒ reasons for action ‒ simply on 
the basis of social facts». This is, I think, right (but see below, n. 41 
and accompanying text), provided that the important qualification set 
out in the next footnote is taken into account. 
29  It follows, then, that (as Shapiro explicitly claims in SHAPIRO 2011b, 
which is apparently an earlier version of the material in SHAPIRO 2011a, 
chs. 5-6, at 69) the existence of legal norms does in fact depend on nor-
mative facts, but these facts are facts about our planning psychology, 
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4.  The authority of plans 
 
But, we may wish to inquire further, what does the authority 
of plans consist in? 
The adoption of a plan is, as we have seen (see above, 
2), a way of settling on a course of action. This means that 
plans are not supposed to enter into the balance of ordinary, 
ground-level reasons for or against a given course of action. 
Rather, they are “supposed to preempt”, and purport to pro-
vide a reason to preempt30, deliberation on the balance of 
 
 
deriving from the norms of instrumental rationality which are partly 
constitutive of this psychology (see above, n. 16); the relevant normative 
facts do not ‒ as natural law theory would have it ‒ depend on, or derive 
from, moral norms. It should be noted, however, that in recent writings 
Bratman has developed, in addition to an instrumental justification of 
planning, a further, different rationale, having to do with human agents’ 
quest for self-governance and autonomy. See BRATMAN 2009b, 412, esp. 
n. 2 («for planning agents like us, our reason for conforming to these 
norms of practical rationality derives in part from our reason to govern 
our own lives»), 417-418, 429, 430, 436; BRATMAN 2009c, 54 and n. 64 
(«structures of cross-temporal and interpersonal planning are partly con-
stitutive of […] forms of cross-temporal integrity, cross-temporal self-
government, […] that we highly value»). Shapiro hints at these devel-
opments in n. 4 to ch. 5. To the extent that self-governance and auton-
omy may be held to be ideas strictly related to morality (or, perhaps, 
straightforward moral values) these developments may raise trouble for 
Shapiro’s purportedly positivistic plan-based solution to the Possibility 
Puzzle. If planning is constitutive of self-governance and autonomy, and 
if its rationale and justification is rooted (in addition to its instrumental 
value) in the moral value of self-governance and autonomy, then, in a 
sense, our capacity for planning is, indeed, “conferred on us by moral-
ity”. The existence and authority of the laws, qua plans, do indeed rest, 
according to this line of reasoning, on moral norms (as well as on the 
relevant norms of instrumental rationality). 
30  SHAPIRO 2011a, 128 f. 
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reasons and (as we have also seen; see above, 2) to structure 
further deliberation about how to carry them out. Plans, qua 
framework reasons, have preemptive force with respect to 
ordinary, ground-level reasons for action: when we have a 
plan to A, deliberation on the merits (about whether to A or 
not) is foreclosed ‒ otherwise, it would be useless to have 
the plan in the first place.  
What we have been calling the “authority” of plans con-
sists of this peculiar kind of force the commitment involved 
in adopting a plan involves: the issue is settled, i.e. delibera-
tion on the merits is foreclosed. Plans do not enter into the 
balance of ordinary reasons for action and ‒ within limits 
(see below, 5.1) ‒ they supplant the weighing of reasons. A 
planner’s rationality consists (up to a point, as we shall see) 
in not questioning whether there are good reasons for doing 
what the plan dictates, outweighing whatever reasons there 
may be against it. This justifies talking of plans as endowed 
with “authority” of a sort. 
In PT this holds, since laws are plans, of laws as well31. 
And this entails, according to Shapiro, a very strong claim 
about the nature of law, and the ways in which the existence 
and content of the laws can be apprehended.  
Plans, we have just seen, can play the role they are sup-
posed to play only by pre-empting deliberation on the merits; 
thus, says Shapiro, «[t]he existence and content of a plan can-
not be determined by facts whose existence the plan aims to 
settle»32 (this is what Shapiro, calls the “logic of planning”)33. 
 
 
31  See e.g. SHAPIRO 2011a, 201 f., 275. 
32  SHAPIRO 2011a, 275. 
33  SHAPIRO 2011a, 275: «It would be self-defeating […] to have 
plans do the thinking for us if the right way to discover their existence 
or content required us to do the thinking ourselves! […] For example, 
suppose I want to know whether I have a plan to go to Mexico for 
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From this, argues Shapiro, it follows that «[l]egal facts are 
determined by social facts alone»34 . Shapiro calls this the 
“Exclusivity Thesis” (distinctive of exclusive legal positiv-
ism). In other words, PT supports, via the logic of planning, 
the rejection of inclusive legal positivism:  
 
«[i]f the point of having law is to settle matters about what 
morality requires so that members of the community can real-
ize certain goals and values, then legal norms would be use-
less if the way to discover their existence is to engage in 
moral reasoning. Legal norms that lack pedigrees are like can 
openers that work only when the cans are already opened»35. 
 
All this gives us a very austere picture of the kind of practi-
cal reasoning laws, qua plans, support. Legal plans should 
be discoverable independently of any inquiry about what the 
right answer is to the issues they are meant to settle; and, 
once discovered, they should be taken as supplanting ‒ 
within limits36 ‒ any such inquiry. But, on the other hand, 
the kind of practical reasoning typical of agents who delib-
 
 
winter vacation. If I do have such a plan, then the right way to dis-
cover its existence cannot require me to first figure out whether I 
ought to go to Mexico this winter for vacation. After all, the whole 
point of having such a plan is to settle that very question. Deliberation 
on the merits would violate the logic of planning because I would be 
doing the activity that the plan is supposed to do for me. If I must 
deliberate in order to discover the plan, then I do not have the plan». 
34  SHAPIRO 2011a, 269. As well as by facts about instrumental ra-
tionality, constitutive of human capacity for planning (see above, nn. 
16 and 29, and accompanying text). 
35  SHAPIRO 2011a, 275. 
36  But, as we shall see (see below, 5.2), it is not at all easy to deter-
mine what these limits may sensibly be taken to be, and PT’s sketchy 
answer to this question proves unsatisfactory. 
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erate within the framework provided by previously adopted 
plans may also be characterized as creative. Plans are, typi-
cally, partial; and planning agents have to devise appropriate 
means, preliminary steps, subplans, and ways of specifying 
them in concrete circumstances, in order to carry out their 
plans (see above, 2). All this requires, within the framework 
of the plan, a good measure of imagination and ingenuity. 
Two comments are appropriate here. (1) The characteriza-
tion of plans as endowed with preemptive force (relative to the 
balancing of ground-level reasons), and PT’s argument for ex-
clusive legal positivism (based, as we have just seen, on the 
“logic of planning”) bear an obvious affinity to Raz’s view that 
mandatory norms are protected reasons for action, involving 
second-order exclusionary reasons (see above, 1), and to his 
argument in favour of the Sources Thesis37, premised on the 
assumption that law claims authority (roughly: legal directives 
purport to be authoritative; thus, they must be such that they can 
be authoritative; authoritative reasons for action include exclu-
sionary reasons: they preempt deliberation on the merits of the 
case; thus, legal directives must be such that their existence and 
content can be discovered without resorting to deliberation on 
the merits ‒ i.e., independently of moral considerations)38.  
Now, it is true that plans give shape to and focus our 
deliberation, by selecting relevant and admissible options, 
and that they settle practical issues. But they are not rea-
 
 
37  RAZ 1994. 
38  The former affinity is noted by SCHIAVELLO 2012, par. 6, the latter 
by EDMUNDSON 2011, 278. See also SCHAUER 2010, 597. Schauer 
characterizes plans as providing “content-independent” reasons for 
action, and notes that, under this respect, they are «intimately con-
nected with the content-independent notion of legal authority itself» 
(where authority is to be understood along the lines of Raz’s theory of 
authority, SCHAUER 2010, 597; see also 607).  
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sons for action in the way in which Razian protected or 
exclusionary reasons are. 
(a) They are not protected reasons. Razian protected reasons 
involve reasons to act in a certain way: ceteris paribus, or pro 
tanto, they make it rational to perform (or make eligible) the 
relevant action. But plans are not, in this way, reasons for acting 
as planned. Understanding them in this way would «lead […] 
us to sanction unacceptable forms of bootstrapping»39. If plans 
were, in this way, reasons for acting as planned, this would en-
tail that a plan to A could, in principle, tip the balance of rea-
sons for and against A-ing. Thus, it would at least sometimes be 
possible for an agent to make A-ing a rational thing to do, and 
to make A-ing rational of him, by simply adopting the plan to A. 
By adopting the plan, the agent could bootstrap himself into 
rationality, no matter whether A-ing is a sensible thing to do, 
and whether it would be rational of him to A, in the first place. 
This would indeed make it too easy for an agent to get off the 
hook of a charge of irrationality for having settled on A-ing un-
derstanding plans as reasons for acting as planned has highly 
counterintuitive implications.  
It follows that, appearances notwithstanding, the idea that 
laws are plans cannot account for the assumption that the law 
provides reasons for acting in certain ways, by telling people 
what they ought to do40. This assumption is the core tenet of 
the reasons paradigm in contemporary jurisprudence (see 
above, 1). Thus, appearances notwithstanding, PT does not in 
fact qualify as a version of the reasons paradigm41. 
 
 
39  BRATMAN 1987, 24. 
40  This is explicitly argued for in BRATMAN 2011, 75 ff. Bratman 
comments here «I am unsure whether I am disagreeing with Shapiro» 
(BRATMAN 2011, 75). And, indeed, it is hard to tell. But this, it should 
be emphasized, is no secondary issue. 
41  Remember, however, Schauer’s remark that «[m]uch of Shapiro’s 
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(b) Plans are not exclusionary reasons either. The way in 
which plans structure practical reasoning ‒ namely, as frame-
work reasons (see above, 2) ‒ differs from the way in which 
exclusionary reasons constrain it. They are not reasons for not 
acting on certain (sorts of) reasons. «[F]iltering out certain 
options from one’s deliberation» ‒ which is what framework 
reasons do ‒ is different from “disregarding certain reasons”42. 
Thus, one must be very careful in reading the claim that 
plans are framework reasons. This claim should be under-
stood in accordance with what has just been said. Plans are 
not reasons for acting as planned, nor are they Razian norms. 
Thus, resemblance between Raz’ argument for the Sources 
Thesis and PT’s “logic of planning” argument for exclusive 
positivism might also prove superficial. 
(2) It may plausibly be argued that Shapiro’s “logic of 
planning” argument for legal positivism, of the exclusive 
variety, proceeds too quickly, for two reasons43. First, the 
possibility of a plan directing agents to make use, in speci-
fied circumstances (in which, e.g., they may be expected to 
act mindlessly), of their moral judgment, is not ruled out by 
the logic of planning. Second, a law, qua plan, may settle 
the issue concerning the applicability, to a given kind of 
case, of a certain moral predicate, or set of moral predicates, 
while leaving it open ‒ and allowing the solution to that 
case depend on ‒ whether a different moral predicate, or set 
 
 
argument is situated within […] the attempt to explain how law can 
provide oughts ‒ reasons for action ‒ simply on the basis of social 
facts» (SCHAUER 2010, 595, n. 33; cfr. also BIX 2012, 445; SIMMONDS 
2012, 255, 259). It is very difficult, in reading Legality, to resist this 
impression. This is, precisely, what makes an inquiry into our subject, 
PT and practical rationality, appropriate. 
42  BRATMAN 1987, 180, n. 11; cfr. also BRATMAN 2007, 290, n. 15. 
43  WALDRON 2011, 895 f.  
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of such predicates, applies or not applies in an individual 
case (of the kind it disciplines)44. 
 
 
5.  Fundamental issues 
 
When considered in the light of its impact on our under-
standing of the role of laws in practical reasoning, PT raises 
two fundamental issues. 
 
5.1. Whose authority, over whom? 
 
So far, I have been talking of the commitment that plans 
involve as inputs in “our” practical reasoning, and of the 
authority that plans have on “us”. But who are we? In the 
case of ordinary, garden-variety planning the answer is 
straightforward: the planners themselves. The commitment 
 
 
44  See also MELERO DE LA TORRE 2012, 230; EDMUNDSON 2011, 279: 
«incorporated moral norms can indeed “make a difference” in the reason-
ing of those to whom the law applies. By incorporating a certain moral 
value, such as fairness or equality, a legal norm can restrict the reasoning of 
a deliberator who would otherwise be inclined to weigh fairness against 
other moral values, such as utility». What Shapiro’s argument in Legality 
(elsewhere, Shapiro has paid attention to this kind of objection) does in fact 
show, on the one hand, is that «law […] must resist re-evaluation of its 
underlying (moral) merits to be useful» (YANKAH 2011). This is a much 
weaker conclusion than the one Shapiro wants to draw (namely, the Exclu-
sivity Thesis), which might perhaps ground some variety of normative legal 
positivism (WALDRON 2011, 893 f.; see also GUEST 2011, par. 1). (Mean-
ing, by “normative legal positivism”, an ethical-political outlook built 
around this substantive thesis: it is desirable that the law should be such 
that it can be identified, and its content determined, on the basis of so far as 
possible non-controversial, easily identifiable, readily accessible social 
facts; cfr. CELANO 2013, par. 2.) 
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involved in planning is commitment on the part of the plan-
ning agent. The authority of plans is the authority plans have 
over planners. But what about legal plans? 
Legal planning also involves, at first glance at least, 
planning for others. And this, it seems, is not a secondary or 
unimportant feature of the law. Laws, including the funda-
mental laws of a legal system (what Shapiro calls its “master 
plan”) are plans that certain individuals form and adopt 
(also) for other individuals, and that apply (also) to the lat-
ter’s behaviour. Legal plans claim authority over agents 
other than those who have created them. They purport to 
play the role plans as such are supposed to play (see above, 
2 and 4) in the practical reasoning of the public at large. 
Or do they? An affirmative answer to this question in-
vites an obvious rejoinder45: why on earth should I be bound 
‒ in the way that plans bind (by involving, i.e., a two-
dimensional commitment; see above, 2) ‒ by a plan that 
somebody else has created for me? Plans have authority 
over planners (see above, 4). But why should I take myself 
to be subject to the authority of a “plan” ‒ a norm (see 
above, 1) ‒ that somebody else has dictated for my behav-
iour? Why should such norms play the role of plans ‒ the 
role, that is, of framework reasons, involving a two-
dimensional commitment ‒ in my practical reasoning?  
There is a twofold problem here for PT. First, we do not, 
I take it, wish to allow that anybody can come across and 
dictate a norm for my behaviour, that eo ipso is binding on 
me, commits me to perform the prescribed action, and 
should play the role of a framework reason in my delibera-
tion. There must be an explanation why some individual has 
‒ if anybody ever has it ‒ the power to dictate binding 
norms to another individual. (Suppose X “plans” for Y. Ab-
 
 
45  CELANO 2012a. 
Bruno Celano 233 
sent special considerations, Y might well object to X’s 
“plan”: so what?) 
Second, why should such norms be termed “plans”? 
Bratmanian plans are formed and adopted by the planning 
agent (be the relevant agency in the first person singular, or 
in the first person plural; cfr. below, in this section). Sup-
pose that X has the power to dictate to Y a binding norm ‒ a 
norm such that Y ought to comply with it ‒; it seems that 
such a norm would not be a plan (in Bratman’s sense). In 
this situation, the notion of a plan (in Bratman’s sense), it 
seems, does not apply. It is one thing for X to form and 
adopt a plan (and, thus, to give to herself a framework rea-
son for action), quite another for her to acquire a reason for 
A-ing because Y has “planned” that she should A. In the 
latter hypothesis, the word “plan” has not the same meaning 
as in the former. 
There are two strategies open to PT in dealing with this 
difficulty. Both strategies, however, involve a dramatic re-
adjustment of PT, and a drastic limitation of its explanatory 
ambitions. The first consists in narrowing the scope of the 
commitment involved in legal plans to their authors, 
namely, officials. The other is to narrow the application of 
PT to those in the citizenry, and among officials, who ac-
cept, making them their own, the plans formed for them.  
What is not an open strategy, I think, is to take it for 
granted ‒ or, worse, to regard as a conceptual truth, or as a 
matter of the fundamental nature of law ‒ that, wherever a 
legal system exists, the whole set of the individuals to 
whose behaviour the norms of the system apply make up a 
single, unified macro-agent of sorts, whose plans (just like it 
happens in the case of individual planners) have authority 
over itself. True, plans may be shared by a plurality of indi-
viduals, whose actions and intentions are appropriately ad-
justed to one another so as to make up for the collective 
execution of a single, unified plan, via the execution, by 
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different agents, of its appropriately meshing sub-plans46. So 
understood, agency in the first person plural is not an im-
possible, or indeed unusual, phenomenon. The paradigm 
case are small-scale groups of like-minded individuals, who 
share the intention of pursuing definite, relatively circum-
scribed goals. An example of this might be an orchestra 
playing a symphony, or a football team whose members are 
engaged in the enterprise of playing, to the best of their ca-
pabilities, a football match. It would be ill-advised, how-
ever, to try to understand the way in which a contemporary 
municipal legal system organises the behaviour of billions 
of willing and unwilling, consenting and often at least partly 
dissenting, often (as Shapiro himself rightly, and repeatedly, 
emphasizes)47 alienated individuals, on the model of an or-
chestra or a sport team. The attitudes of these individuals 
toward the law are, typically, too disparate. Not to talk about 
differences in power, status and wealth, and the conflicts they 
give rise to. The operations of a whole legal system should 
not, I think, be understood as an instance of agency in the first 
person plural (in the above sense), where all the individuals to 
whose behaviour the norms of the system apply participate. 
This would be, I think, naïve, and simplistic48. 
So, let us explore the two strategies open to PT, and their 
import on PT’s claim that laws play, in the practical reason-
ing of some agents, the role of plans. 
(1) For officials only. The first strategy is to narrow the 
scope of the commitment involved in legal plans to their 
authors, namely, officials. In a hierarchical institutionalised 
 
 
46  As hinted above, n. 17, Bratman has explored various possibili-
ties of “jointly intention action”. Shapiro further develops some of 
his ideas. 
47  E.g., SHAPIRO 2011a, 97, 204. 
48  Cfr. further on this issue CELANO 2012a, par. 5. 
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structure of planning, such as the law (see above, 2), some 
of the officials will plan for other officials. But, so long as 
all of them are part of the institution (which, as we have 
seen, is an impersonal structure, consisting of abstract roles, 
or offices), occupying distinct offices in the structure, we 
may assume that all those officials for whom plans are 
formed and adopted (even alienated ones) are, in fact, sub-
ject to their authority. 
This is a viable strategy. It has, however, the drawback 
of narrowing to the officials of the system (and the authors 
of its master plan) the scope of the guidance that the laws, 
qua plans, purport to provide. On this reading, PT’s main 
claim ‒ laws are plans ‒ is true with respect to officials only. 
(2) Commitment through acceptance. The second strat-
egy consists in granting that PT’s main claim is true only 
with respect to those, among the individuals to whose be-
haviour the laws apply, who ‒ be they officials or laypeople 
‒ accept the plans formed for them, and so make these plans 
(formed by others) their own. According to this strategy, 
that is, legal norms are plans only with respect to those who 
adopt them as such for the guidance of their own conduct, 
thus subjecting to the authority of these plans (i.e., commit-
ting themselves to their execution, and to treating them as 
framework reasons in their deliberation). 
This, too, may be a viable solution, depending on how 
the relevant notion of the “acceptance” of a plan is under-
stood (Does the victim, in handling his purse to the prover-
bial gunman, “accept” the latter’s plan to rob him of his 
purse?). It too, however, involves a drastic limitation of the 
truth of PT’s main claim. 
Which of these strategies PT actually deploys, or should ‒ 
on grounds of consistency and coherence ‒ deploy? It is not at 
all easy, I shall now argue, to answer this question. Neither 
strategy fits all of what Shapiro says. But, on the other hand, 
there are things he says that hint in both directions.  
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First, it remains unclear whether what PT claims is that 
the “fundamental rules” ‒ only the fundamental rules ‒ of a 
legal system are plans, or that laws ‒ all legal norms as such 
‒ are plans. Shapiro sometimes seems to put forward the 
first, limited claim49, while at other times he clearly states, 
or implies the latter (or, again, what he does in fact say en-
tails the latter)50. On the first hypothesis, it seems, PT ap-
plies to those individuals whose behaviour the “fundament 
rules” of a legal system directly organise, namely, officials. 
On this hypothesis, in other words, law comprises a set of 
norms which are plans of the officials (and the authors of 
the master plan), plus a set of norms ‒ those purporting to 
organise the behaviour of ordinary citizens ‒ which are not, 
as such plans. On the second hypothesis, on the contrary, all 
laws are somebody’s plans. These two claims are different, 
and have different implications51.  
 
 
49  Cfr. e.g. the alternative statement of PT’s main claim in n. 13 
above: «the fundamental rules of legal systems are plans. Their func-
tion is to structure legal activity so that participants can work together 
and thereby achieve goods and realize values that would otherwise be 
unattainable» (SHAPIRO 2011a, 119). 
50  “[L]aws are plans” (SHAPIRO 2011a, 195). Or see, again, the 
statement of PT’s main claim in the text above, 2: «legal rules are 
themselves generalized plans […], issued by those who are authorized 
to plan for others. And adjudication involves the application of these 
plans, or planlike norms, to those to whom they apply» (SHAPIRO 
2011a, 155). 
51  So, e.g., when Shapiro claims (alternative formulation of PT’s 
main claim) that «the fundamental rules of legal systems are plans. 
Their function is to structure legal activity so that participants can 
work together» (SHAPIRO 2011a, 119), by “participants” we presuma-
bly have to understand: officials; and the “working together” Shapiro 
mentions is, apparently, the complex set of officials’ activities. The 
individuals whose behaviour legal plans directly organise are, on this 
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Second, in arguing that laws are plans, and that legal ac-
tivity is shared activity, Shapiro usually assumes that those 
to whom the relevant norms apply52 accept the plans others 
have formed and adopted for them. Let me give two detailed 
examples of this. 
In the section titled Introducing hierarchy53, what the “head 
chef” of the Cooking Club (Shapiro’s fictitious paradigm of a 
relatively simple kind of joint activity, in which shared organ-
ised planning gradually develops) does is, trivially, issuing or-
ders («that is, I can order them to do so»)54. It is only because 
we, the “sous chefs”, accept the plans he made for us, or be-
cause we accept his authority, that his orders are binding on us. 
 
 
reading, the officials of the system. While, on the other hand, when he 
claims that “laws are plans”, the individuals whose behaviour legal 
plans are supposed to organise are, it seems to follow, all those to 
whose behaviour legal norms apply. And ‒ unless Shapiro wants to 
“go Kelsenian” (STONE 2012, 225) and claim that all legal norms, as 
such, are addressed to officials (something Shapiro does not say, and 
that is quite alien to PT’s general drift; cfr. WALDRON 2011, 889 f.; 
STONE 2012, 225) ‒ the two things are different. The latter claim (laws 
are plans), in fact, has a paradoxical ring to it: in what sense may a 
criminal statute prohibiting, e.g., murder, be held to be a “plan” for 
the behaviour of those to whom it applies? (For a sympathetic explo-
ration of some possibilities see WALDRON 2011, 889-891, BIX 2012, 
447; for criticism see STONE 2012, 224 f.) This difficulty is related to 
the one discussed in the text. With respect to whom, exactly, are ‒ 
according to PT ‒ legal norms plans? 
52 Be they the members of the Cooking Club (SHAPIRO 2011a, 139), people 
working for Cooking Club Inc. (SHAPIRO 2011a, 144), inhabitants of 
Cooks’ Island (SHAPIRO 2011a, 157), residents at Del Boca Vista (SHAPIRO 
2011a, 217), or people involved in the operations of a legal system. 
53  SHAPIRO 2011a, 140 ff. 
54  SHAPIRO 2011a, 141. 
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Shapiro writes55: «when the head chef orders a sous chef to per-
form some action, we might say that she “adopts a plan” for the 
sous chef». So, can anybody, at will, adopt a plan for me? No, 
but, unsurprisingly, acceptance of plans adopted for me by 
someone else (i.e., adoption, in the first person, of the plan), and 
commitment to carrying it out, make me subject to the norma-
tive requirements planning is governed by. Thus, 
 
«by issuing the order, the head chef places the sous chef under a 
norm designed to guide his conduct and to be used as a standard 
for evaluation. Moreover, the head chef does not intend her or-
der to be treated as one more consideration to be taken into ac-
count when the sous chef plans what to do. Rather, she means it 
to settle the matter in her favour. And because the sous chef ac-
cepts the hierarchical relationship, he will adopt the content of 
the order as his plan [emphasis added] and revise his other 
plans so that they are consistent with the order. He will treat the 




«parts of the shared plan authorize certain members of the 
group to flesh out or apply the other parts of the shared 
plan. These “authorizations” are accepted when members of 
the group agree to surrender their exclusive power to plan 
and commit to follow the plans formulated and applied by 
the authorized members [emphasis added]. Thus, when 
someone authorized by the shared plan issues an order, she 
thereby extends the plan and gives members of the group 
new sub-plans to follow»57. 
 
 
55  SHAPIRO 2011a, 141. 
56  SHAPIRO 2011a, 141. 
57  SHAPIRO 2011a, 142. 
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When somebody else adopts a plan for me, and I myself adopt 
it ‒ or commit myself to its execution (maybe, because I have 
somehow transferred to him my power to adopt plans for my-
self) ‒ then I have a plan. Is this all Shapiro means? So, is PT 
to be understood as claiming that legal norms are plans just in 
case the individuals to whose behaviour they apply accept 
them as their own plans, committing themselves to carrying 
them out, and for these individuals only? Or perhaps what PT 
claims is that, as a matter of conceptual necessity, or of the 
fundamental nature of law, individuals to whose behaviour 
legal norms apply adopt them as plans? Legality does not 
provide a unique answer to these questions. 
Consider, as a second example, the section in ch. 6 titled 
The Inner Rationality of Law
58. Here, the norms of instru-
mental rationality («the distinctive norms of rationality that 
attend the activity of planning»59: consistency, means-end 
coherence, not reconsidering absent compelling reason) ap-
ply only to those who accept the fundamental legal rules 
(i.e., the master plan), that is, only to legal officials and to 
“good” citizens (The relevant norms of rationality govern 
the activity of planning; thus, they apply only to those who 
are committed to the plan.) Bad men ‒ that is (or so it 
seems), all those who have not accepted the legal norms 
applying to their behaviour as their own plans ‒ are not sub-
ject to their constraints 60. Laws are plans, it seems, only for 
 
 
58  SHAPIRO 2011a, 183. 
59  SHAPIRO 2011a, 183.  
60  «The inner rationality of law, of course, is a limited set of con-
straints because the rational norms of planning only apply to those 
who accept plans. The bad man, therefore, cannot be rationally critici-
sable for failing to obey legal authorities insofar as he does not accept 
the law» (SHAPIRO 2011a, 183). Cfr. also SHAPIRO 2011a, 149: «in 
order for a group to act together, they need not intend the success of 
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restricted and variable, depending on contingent factors (in-
dividuals’ changing attitudes), sections of those to whose 
behaviour they apply. 
So, Shapiro seems to imply that laws are plans only 
with respect to those who accept them as their own plans, 
or at least accept that their creators (i.e. officials) are enti-
tled to plan for them61. This dispels the difficulty (“Whose 
plans?”). It dispels it, however, at a high price. If we as-
sume that all individuals involved accept the relevant 
plans, making them their own as if they had designed and 
adopted them for themselves, talk of plans ‒ and of the 
distinctive kind of commitment plans involve (their dis-
tinctive authority; see above, 2 and 4) ‒ surely becomes 
appropriate. In this hypothesis, unsurprisingly, laws will in 
fact play, in the practical reasoning of these individuals, 
the role plans are supposed to play. But this is a way of 
making the intended claim (i.e., that laws are plans, and 
thus have, for those to whose behaviour they apply, the 
characteristic, non-moral, authority that plans as such 
have) trivially true. If we assume that the relevant indi-
viduals bind themselves, or commit themselves to comply-
ing with the law, we should not be surprised to find them 
bound, or committed62. True, in the case of the law we are 
 
 
the joint enterprise. They need only share a plan. That plan, in turn, 
can be developed by someone who does intend the success of the joint 
activity. As long as participants accept the plan, intentionally play 
their parts, resolve their disputes peacefully and openly, and all of this 
is common knowledge, they are acting together intentionally». 
61 Or, perhaps, for those accepting the plans and for the officials of the 
system, be they alienated or not, as forming part of the institutional-
ised planning structure (cfr. above in the text, where the “for officials 
only” hypothesis was introduced). 
62 On Cooks’ Island, «the plan which establishes the hierarchy for the 
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dealing with an institutionalised hierarchical structure for 
planning. But this only multiplicates the difficulty. The 
required additional work could only be done, here, by a 
substantive theory of legitimation through acceptance 63 . 
 
 
island is a shared plan» (SHAPIRO 2011a, 165). Shapiro goes on 
(SHAPIRO 2011a, 165 f.): «notice further that since the shared plan was 
designed for the handful of social planners; it is they who share the 
plan, not the islanders as a whole. This means that it is not necessary 
for the community to accept the shared plan in order for it to obtain 
[emphasis added] ‒ though, as a matter of fact, we do approve of the 
plan. Since we consider the social planners to be morally legitimate, 
we plan to allow the adopters and appliers to adopt and apply plans 
for us. For this reason, we consider the shared plan to be the “master 
plan” for the group» (cfr. also SHAPIRO 2011a, 150, 177, 183). What 
does the emphasized “obtain” mean, here? Are those inhabitants that 
do not have accepted the plan supposed to be subject to a plan (and 
the distinctive kind of commitment it involves)? If not, then, how can 
PT claim that laws are plans (unless, of course, the “for officials only” 
strategy is endorsed)? And I cannot see how the answer could plausi-
bly be yes. Once again, why on earth should the “plan” you formed for 
me eo ipso put me under “rational pressure to act accordingly”?  
63  There are, in Legality, some clues of this. See e.g. SHAPIRO 2011a, 
148 f.: «as we have seen, we respond to the challenge of managing a 
large group of inexperienced and unmotivated individuals by requir-
ing them to hand over vast amounts of planning power to us. By ac-
cepting the shared plan, they not only assume certain roles but transfer 
their powers to adopt and apply plans when their plans conflict with 
the planning of the supervisors». “Transfer of planning power” by way 
of acceptance, or consent, has an obvious contractualist flavour. Does 
PT’s main claim (laws are plans) rest on unstated contractualist, or 
quasi-contractualist, premises? In fact, arguments which apparently 
presuppose a theory of legitimation by consent are scattered in 
Shapiro’s book. Consider for example the following principle 
(SHAPIRO 2011a, 142 f.): «the fact that someone adopts a plan for oth-
ers to follow does not, of course, mean that, from the moral point of 
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Such a theory, however, is absent in Legality, and it is totally 
alien to Shapiro’s theoretical enterprise. Moreover, the move ‒ 
assuming that all the parties involved accept the plans applying 
to their behaviour ‒ sheds no light on less irenic situations. The 
assumption is, where law is concerned, problematic. I take it 
that we do not want to make it a matter of conceptual necessity, 
or of the law’s fundamental nature, that laws are accepted by all 
those subject to them.  
Let us take stock. First, neither strategy fits all of what 
Shapiro says; second, there are things he says that hint in 
both directions; but, third, each one of these two strategies 
has, as we have just seen, serious drawbacks. And, finally, 
both strategies mandate, each in its own way, a dramatic 
readjustment of PT, and a radical limitation of its explana-
tory ambitions. In both hypotheses, PT’s bold assertion that 
laws are plans has to be recanted.  
These considerations warrant, it seems to me, a skeptical 
conclusion. Shapiro is unclear about which strategy, if any, 
he endorses. The issue, however, is crucial, and indetermi-
nacy on such a crucial issue undermines the whole enter-
prise. Unless one of the two viable strategies (with its atten-
dant drawbacks) is explicitly and decidedly endorsed, and, 
accordingly, PT’s explanatory ambitions are cut down to 
size in the way it mandates, we are forced to conclude that 
 
 
view, those others ought to comply. The plan might be foolish or evil 
and, thus, unless there are substantial costs associated with non-
conformity, the subjects morally should not carry it out. However, if 
the subject has accepted the shared plan which sets out the hierarchy 
then, from the point of view of instrumental rationality, he is bound to 
heed the plan. For if someone submits to the planning of another, and 
yet ignores an order directed to him, he will be acting in a manner 
inconsistent with his own plan [emphasis added]. His disobedience 
will be in direct conflict with his intention to defer». 
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Bratman’s notion of a plan cannot legitimately be put to the 
use to which Shapiro puts it. Unless one of the two viable 
strategies is endorsed, laws cannot coherently be character-
ized as (Bratmanian) plans64. 
 
 
5.2. Reconsideration  
 
As noted above (see above, 2 and 4), plans are meant to set-
tle practical problems. They are not up for grabs for recon-
sideration at every moment ‒ otherwise, they would be use-
less: they would not be doing the thinking for us. This, 
however, does not mean that they should be executed come 
what may. Planning does not (reasonably) preempt delibera-
tion on the merits whatever may happen, or whatever new 
information the agent may come to acquire. Plans can be, 
and sometimes they reasonably should be, reconsidered, and 
perhaps abandoned. The commitment involved in having a 
plan is a defeasible commitment. 
This raises an obvious question. What are the conditions 
of rational reconsideration for plans? I.e., when is it reason-
able for an agent to reopen the deliberation on the merits 
that lead her to the adoption of a plan, and to reconsider it in 
 
 
64  I have presented elsewhere (CELANO 2012a) a fully-fledged argu-
ment in support of this skeptical conclusion. In a nutshell: plans 
(Bratmnian plans) have authority over their authors. They involve a 
commitment on the part of planners. The laws, on the other hand, 
claim authority over many individuals, officials and non-officials, 
other than their authors. This is why plans can’t do much for legal 
theory. (It is true, however, that Bratman himself is quite sympathetic 
to a marriage between his own views and legal theory. In his more 
recent work, he repeatedly credits Shapiro with suggestions and in-
sights on these matters.) 
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the light of new information or unexpected circumstances65? 
Analogous questions arise for the various versions of the 
reasons paradigm in the field of legal theory66. Roughly: 
granted that legal rules are second-order reasons, the upshot 
of the prior balancing of first-order reasons for and against a 
certain course of action, when ‒ if ever ‒ are we justified, in 
the light of new information or unexpected circumstances, 
in not taking them at face value, and turn back to the rele-
vant first-order reasons, thus reopening our deliberation on 
the merits (just what the rule had supposedly settled)?  
To take three influential examples, the question arises, 
first, with respect to J. Raz’s theory of mandatory norms: 
given that norms provide second-order exclusionary reasons 
for action, when are we justified in suspending their applica-
tion and in acting on the (sorts of) reasons which are, by 
hypothesis, excluded by them? Roughly the same issue may 
be put in terms of Raz’s doctrine of authority: when does 
the possibility that an authoritative directive be mistaken 
reasonably warrant us in deliberating on the merits? 
The question arises ‒ second example ‒ relative to F. 
Schauer’s understanding of rule-based (v. “particularistic”) 
decision-making. Rules are entrenched prescriptive gener-
alizations. This means that their application will, sometimes, 
lead decision-makers to commit mistakes67. When is an en-
 
 
65  Bratman devotes sustained attention to this issue (defining norms 
of “reasonable stability” for plans). Cfr. BRATMAN 1987, ch. 5. 
66  As well as relative to the purported distinction between act- and 
rule-utilitarianism. 
67  Generalizations, as such, are over- and under-inclusive. Entrench-
ing a generalization means not being disposed to check whether the 
case at hand is one with respect to which the generalization is over- or 
under-inclusive. Thus, rule-based decision-making will sometimes 
lead decision-makers to make mistakes. 
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trenched prescriptive generalization reasonably disen-
trenched? (Pursuing this issue leads Schauer to “rule-
sensitive particularism”.)68  
And it arises ‒ third example ‒ relative to the way in 
which M. Atienza and J. Ruiz Manero69 draw the distinction 
between legal rules and principles. Legal rules are 
“opaque”: they hide to our view the balancing of principles 
which, we may assume, justifies them. When, if ever, are we 
justified in treating them as “transparent”, looking through 
them directly to the principles they supposedly embody, and 
their relative weight in the case at hand? 
In general outlines, the problem is as follows. Rules are, 
in our practical reasoning, intermediate entities70: they me-
diate between first-order reasons for action (it does not mat-
ter, here, whether these are understood as based on elements 
in the agent’s psychological makeup, e.g. desires and be-
liefs, or objectively, as facts) and action. In order to play this 
role, they have to be taken at face value, and followed ac-
cording to their tenor. When a practical problem ‒ a “case”‒ 
arises, such that the rule applies to it, the rule should be fol-
lowed. If, on each occasion in which the rule applies, we 
were justified in considering whether and how the relevant 
first-order reasons apply, and whether their balancing in this 
kind of case militates in favour of the line of action the rule 
prescribes, the rule would be useless. It would be perform-
ing no mediating role (Notice the analogy between this line 
of argument and Shapiro’s “logic of planning” argument, 
see above, 4. According to the kind of view we are currently 
discussing, rules, just like Bratmanian plans, are supposed 
 
 
68  SCHAUER 1991a, 93 ff.  
69  ATIENZA and RUIZ MANERO 1996; ATIENZA and RUIZ MANERO 
2000a; ATIENZA and RUIZ MANERO 2000b; cfr. RÓDENAS 1998.  
70  RAZ 2009. 
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to settle practical questions.) But, on the other hand, it 
would be unreasonable to follow the rule blindly on each 
and every occasion in which it applies. Unforeseen circum-
stances may present themselves, new information may shed 
a different light on some of the cases the rule, according to 
its tenor, applies to. In short, unforeseen cases may arise, 
whose peculiarities justify the agent in blocking the rule’s 
application and reconsidering it, in the light of first-order, 
ground-level reasons for or against the line of action it pre-
scribes. Thus, in order to perform reasonably their mediat-
ing function, rules should not always be taken at face value, 
come what may. We have, here, two conflicting exigencies 
‒ we may term them (by themselves, however, these labels 
are scarcely informative) “stability” and “flexibility”. A 
suitable equilibrium should be found between them.  
It is easily understood that providing a satisfactory solution 
to this problem is of crucial importance for the theories I have 
mentioned (and for Shapiro’s). Theories such as these draw, 
and they have to maintain, a distinction between two levels in 
our practical reasoning. Rules, authoritative directives, or, in 
PT, plans, are supposed to belong to the upper, intermediate 
level. But, on the other hand, the distinction, on pain of irration-
ality, shouldn’t be too rigid. (This is only metaphorical, of 
course. How can the metaphor of “rigidity” be cashed? This, 
precisely, is the problem.) So, on the one hand, the divide be-
tween first- and second-order reasons must be firm enough so 
as to operate as a constraint on our deliberation. Allowing 
agents always to reconsider would have the upper level collapse 
on the lower one71. But, on the other hand, taking the constraint 
to be an absolute one would turn a two-tier theory of practical 
rationality into an apology of blind rule- (or plan-) worship. 
 
 
71  This is what in fact happens, I have argued elsewhere (CELANO 
2006), in the theory of Atienza and Ruiz Manero. 
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Shapiro’s treatment of this whole issue is, in Legality, 
sketchy. According to Shapiro, legal norms, just like ordi-
nary, everyday plans, are defeasible. But, he claims, one 
peculiar feature of legal norms, as contrasted with everyday 
plans, is that the laws themselves specify the conditions un-
der which they should be reconsidered, or their application 
blocked ‒ their defeaters. Legal norms (not necessarily one 
by one, perhaps jointly) specify their own defeaters72.  
Is this a plausible position? The question for PT, here, is 
twofold. 
(1) Can a norm ‒ a norm of conduct ‒ reasonably be 
taken to specify in advance, exhaustively and in non-
vacuous terms (e.g., “unless there are compelling reasons to 
the contrary”), its own defeaters73?  
A rule including a (maybe empty) set of detailed excep-
tions is logically possible. And, as a matter of fact, a deci-
sion-maker uncharged of applying a given rule can treat a 
(perhaps empty) set of exceptions as exhaustive. The traffic 
lights, for instance, work in this way. But, I think, the possi-
 
 
72  See e.g. SHAPIRO 2011a, 201 f. («legal institutions are not in the 
business of offering either advice or making requests. They do not 
present their rules as one more factor that subjects are supposed to 
consider when deciding what they should do. Rather, their task is to 
settle normative matters in their favour and claim the right to demand 
compliance. For this reason, deliberating or bargaining with officials 
about the propriety of obedience normally shows profound disrespect 
for them, and for the law’s authority. Regardless of whether seats belts 
are a good idea, passengers are required to buckle up – after all, it’s 
the law»); SHAPIRO 2011a, 275 («laws guide conduct in the same way 
that plans do, namely, by cutting off deliberation and directing the 
subject to act in accordance with the plan»). 
73  Talking of a single norm doing that, or of further norms specifying 
the defeaters of a given norm, does not make any difference, here (cfr. 
SCHAUER 1991b). 
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bility that unforeseen circumstances present themselves, or 
that new information casts a different light on some of the 
cases the rule, according to its tenor, applies to, should be 
taken seriously. And, if we do take it seriously, treating 
rules (or sets of rules) as exhaustively specifying in advance 
their defeaters turns out to be (vacuous specifications aside) 
eminently unreasonable74.  
This does not rule out the possibility that, in special con-
texts, for particular reasons, it may be reasonable to hold 
decision-makers to a strict, exceptionless (apart from those 
detailed exceptions that, maybe, the rule already specifies) 
application of the rule, according to its tenor. There may be 
good, decisive reasons in favour of installing traffic lights at 
a given crossroads. Most importantly, the imposition of 
strictly rule-based decision-making on particular sets of de-
cision-makers, relative to particular sets of decisions, may 
work as an effective device for the allocation of decisional 
power75. But it is doubtful that the law, as such, might rea-
sonably be regarded as such a special context ‒ so as to 
conclude that legal norms, as such, may reasonably be 
treated as norms that exhaustively specify in advance (in 
non-vacuous terms) their defeaters. 
(2) The second question is this: can, specifically, plans 
(in the strict, Bratmanian sense, adopted by PT) exhaus-
tively and non-vacuously specify in advance the conditions 
of their own (justified) reconsideration or abandonment? 
There are, in Bratman’s treatment of the issue of rational 
reconsideration, significant clues supporting a negative an-
swer to this question. According to Bratman, justified non-
reconsideration typically takes place against a background 
of normalcy: typically, an agent is justified in nonrecon-
 
 
74  Cfr. for a fully-fledged argument to this effect CELANO 2012b. 
75  SCHAUER 1991, ch. 7. 
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sidering her plan when the circumstances in which it is to be 
carried out are normal76. This notion ‒ normalcy in the cir-
cumstances of execution ‒ is obviously not amenable to de-
tailed specification77. 
What may the necessary and sufficient conditions be, 
warranting the conclusion that a given situation is normal? 
An answer to the question whether plans can exhaus-
tively and non-vacuously specify the conditions for their 
rational reconsideration has significant implications for PT. 
Were we to discover that a plan, properly so-called, cannot, 
as such, satisfy this condition, and were we to grant Shapiro 
that legal norms do satisfy it, Shapiro’s claim that legal 
norms are plans would be put in jeopardy. Shapiro could not 
consistently claim both that legal norms are plans, and that 
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